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Would I be going too far if I claim that the life of Joseph K. resem-bles the life of the Kantian subject under the moral law? Giorgio Agamben would not think that such a claim is too far-fetched con-
sidering that he himself accused Immanuel Kant of introducing the state of 
exception to modernity:
It is truly astounding how Kant, almost two centuries ago and 
under the heading of a sublime ‘moral feeling,’ was able to de-
scribe the very condition that was to become familiar to the 
mass societies and great totalitarian states of our time. For life 
under a law that is in force without signifying resembles life in 
the state of exception, in which the most innocent gesture or the 
smallest forgetfulness can have most extreme consequences.1
1 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 52. My emphasis.
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Though this excerpt is alone provocative enough, Agamben raised the ante 
even higher with a statement preceding the one above by associating ‘sublime 
moral feeling’ with ‘respect’ and taunted Kant by asking “[d]oes the moral law 
not become something like an ‘inscrutable faculty?’”2 I believe that Agamben 
had in mind the following statement by Kant:
But something different and quite paradoxical takes the place of 
this vainly sought deduction of the moral principle, namely that the 
moral principle, conversely itself serves as the principle of the de-
duction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove 
but which speculative reason had to assume as at least possible (in 
order to find among its cosmological ideas what is unconditioned 
in its causality, so as not to contradict itself), namely the faculty of 
freedom, of which the moral law, which itself has no need of justify-
ing grounds, proves not only the possibility but the reality in beings 
who cognize this law as binding upon them.3 
But how can Kantian moral law even include men within it “in the form of a pure 
relation of abandonment?”4 In this study, I will precisely look at how someone 
who is considered to be trespassing the law can be “at the mercy of others.”5 In 
order to show this, I will focus on masturbation and will argue that because of his 
problematic views on sex and his disdain for the body, Kant formulated duties to 
oneself in a way that the very (personal) act of masturbation merits the masturba-
tor to be banned from the moral community of rational beings and condemns him 
to bare life. In order to be able to do this, I will first examine Agamben’s emphasis 
on the Kantian sublime in order to show why I believe it is a subtle but very import-
ant emphasis and furthermore how central it is for Kantian morality.
Ι. Sublime moral feeling
Kant never claimed that human beings can act in a perfectly rational way. The simple 
fact that we are “embodied creatures of feeling and sensibility”6 meant for Kant that 
2 Ibid. 
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 41; 5: 47, 21-37.
4 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 51.
5 Ibid., 29, 110.
6 Paul Crowther, The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), 17.
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there are “possible incentives”7 out there which can and indeed do make us act in 
heteronomous ways.8 But and this is where a Kantian twist comes in, he also thought 
that there are stronger incentives out there which can invoke profound feelings within 
and nudge us in acting in accordance with the moral law that we also author. After 
all, if Kant did not think that there was such a possibility, he would not have unwaver-
ingly declared merely six years before his death that “morality, not understanding, is 
what first makes us human beings.”9 According to John R. Goodreau,10 this is precisely 
why Kant had a lifelong interest in aesthetics because, even early on his career, Kant 
related morality “to human experience through feelings that are described in aesthetic 
terms.” 11 Kant contemplated on these feelings so as to provide a motivation that 
would make us “sacrifice [our] sensible interests to supersensible rationality,”12 so that 
we can rise above “all merely sensuous beings.”13 In this light, let us remember Kant’s 
famous statement which now also embellishes his tombstone.14 Not only this famous 
passage is a testament to the brilliance of the “Sage of Königsberg” to have the vision 
to seek “the validity of both the laws of the starry skies above and the moral law” 
within “the legislative power of human intellect itself,”15 but it is also the sublime in 
a condensed form. What follows is my attempt to unpack the sublime in the passage 
which, I believe, Agamben also had in mind. 16
ΙΙ. Respect
Though it is a task beyond the means of this essay, let me briefly clarify what 
is “the sublime.” Kant defined the sublime in comparison with the beautiful.17 
7 Matthew C. Altman, “Introduction: Kant the Revolutionary,” in The Palgrave Kant Handbook, 
ed. Matthew C. Altman, 1-17 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 9.  
8 Oliver Sensen, “Duties to Oneself,” in The Palgrave Kant Handbook, ed. Matthew C. Altman, 
285-306 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 289. 
9 Immanuel Kant, “The Conflict of the Faculties,” in Religion and Rational Theology, trans. 
Mary J. Gregor, and Robert Anchor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 291; 7: 
72, 34-35.
10 John R. Goodreau, The Role of the Sublime in Kant’s Moral Metaphysics (Washington: The 
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1998), 9.
11 Ibid., 24.
12 Robert R. Clewis, The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 227. 
13 Goodreau, 109, 113-114.
14 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 129; 5: 162-163, 33-36, 1-23.
15 Paul Guyer, “Introduction: The Starry Heavens and the Moral Law,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, ed. Paul Guyer, 1-27 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 2. 
16 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 52.
17 Immanuel Kant, “Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime,” in Observations 
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For instance, after many depicting examples, he considered the night as sub-
lime, while the day as beautiful and summarized the influences these “finer 
feelings” invoke in us as: “[t]he sublime touches, the beautiful charms.”18 Kant 
went on to elaborate on the sublime and described three “different sorts” of 
the sublime.19 Despite these different sorts of the sublime, he concluded that 
when it comes to “the qualities of the sublime and the beautiful in human 
being in general,” they inspire different feeling as “[s]ublime qualities inspire 
esteem, but beautiful ones inspire love.”20 Though Kant went on to provide 
even more details on the qualities of these two distinct finer feelings, I argue 
that the sublime boils down to “respect.”21 Noting that there are differences 
between the effects of the feelings of beautiful and sublime, Robert R. Clewis 
also described the experience of the feeling of the sublime as revealing in 
that through respect it invokes in us “the sublime can prepare us for moral 
agency.”22 But what exactly are we to respect? Kant was pretty clear about 
to whom we owe respect because for Kant: “Respect is always directed only 
to persons, never to things.”23 Yes, for Kant, “person” is the one who can act 
according to maxims in line with what reason demands but this does not by 
itself explain why we are to respect persons. Unless, according to Clewis,24 
we point out that respect for a person is equal to the respect for the moral 
law. Indeed, in a long footnote in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant firmly asserted that:
Any respect for a person is properly only respect for the law (of 
integrity and so forth) of which he gives us an example. Because 
we also regard enlarging our talents as a duty, we represent a 
person of talents also as, so to speak, an example of the law (to 
become like him in this by practice), and this is what constitutes 
our respect. All so-called moral interest consists simply in re-
spect for the law.25 
on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings, eds., and trans. Patrick Frierson, 




21 I am well aware of the minor modifications as well as the continuity in Kant’s thinking on the 
sublime. However, for the sake of brevity, I will refrain from discussing these. See e.g. Clewis, 
13- 14, 140; Goodreau, 9; Crowther, 7-41.
22 Clewis, 3.
23 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 64; 5: 76, 24-31.
24 Clewis, 127.
25 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: 
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It is precisely this interest which is nothing but the respect for the moral law 
Kant termed as “the moral feeling.”26 It is because of this formulation on 
Kant’s part which led Lewis White Beck to argue that “the respect for the law 
and the respect for our personality are not distinct and even competing feel-
ings, as are the two feelings which merge in our experience of the sublime.”27 
In other words, thanks to the feeling of respect invoked in us through the 
experience of the sublime,28 we can meet the requirement to “treat rational 
nature as more valuable than any merely desired end.”29 According to Clewis, 
the sublime does this precisely because it has “phenomenological and struc-
tural affinities with the moral feeling of respect”30 and in doing so we become 
aware of ourselves as “moral persons who, like the aesthetic subject experi-
encing the sublime, merit dignity […]”31 It is for this reason, as Paul Crowther 
pointed out, Kant defined personality in his second Critique “[…] exclusively in 
terms of such sublime moral consciousness.”32 It is through such a conscious-
ness, we esteem “[…] something even against our sensible interest”33 because 
Kant’s move to ground moral consciousness on the supersensible, as I will try 
to show below, “[…] renders it ontologically superior to any phenomenal ob-
ject or state.”34 It is precisely at this point where a “doorway” opens up which 
connects the sensible to the supersensible in the sense that the supersensible 
exercises its indispensable influence on the sensible.35 
ΙΙΙ. Supersensible
I have dealt with the first section of the above quotation through the feeling 
of respect in that, even though we are merely an “animal creature,” through 
the feeling of the sublime we also become aware of our capacity for morality 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 14; 4: 402.
26 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 66; 5:80, 11-18; Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power 
of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer, and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 140; 5: 257, 9-10. 
27 Quoted in Goodreau, 50-51.
28 Ibid., 88.
29 Lara Denis, “Kant on the Wrongness of ‘Unnatural’ Sex,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 16, 






35 Goodreau, 62, 93.
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which in turn invokes in us a feeling of respect both for our own personal-
ity and for others.36 The second section of the above quotation is perhaps 
the most important function of the sublime in Kantian morality because it is 
through this function of the sublime that we get to comprehend the “higher 
purposiveness”37 and realize that thanks to the powers of the human mind we 
are practically free.38
In the third Critique, Kant associated the power of the aesthetic judgment 
in the case of sublimity with “the inner purposiveness in the disposition of the 
powers of the mind.”39 What this means, as Goodreau explained, is that 
aesthetic judgments regarding the sublime is a contingent use 
we make of the presentation, not for the sake of cognizing the 
object as we do through the feeling associated with the beauti-
ful, but for the sake of a feeling of the inner purposiveness in the 
predisposition of our mental powers. 40
In this awakened awareness of one’s own mental powers can one author a 
life that is “independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world.” 
In fact, Kant was rejoiced in the face of the power of human mind even to be 
able to think of the infinite that he takes it to be the proof of the fact that 
“the human mind […] is itself supersensible.”41 This is in itself sublime and thus 
also a proof for the pivotal role of the sublime in Kantian morality in showing 
that “[…] this supersensible power of ours is what makes morality possible.” 
In other words, if we can transcend the sensible world, we can very well be 
moral. 42
IV. Kant on body and sexuality
If Jean-Luc Nancy43 was correct in claiming that the body is the “latest, most 
worked over, sifted, refined, dismantled and reconstructed product” of West-
ern civilization, it is only natural that Kant was among those people who 
36 Clewis, 87; Goodreau, 11, 20; Crowther, 26.
37 Melissa McBay Merritt, “Sublimity and Joy: Kant on the Aesthetic Constitution of Virtue,” in 
The Palgrave Kant Handbook, ed. Matthew C. Altman, 447-467 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017), 458.  
38 Clewis, 215.
39 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 49; 5: 250, 14-15.
40 Goodreau, 62.
41 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 138; 5: 255, 35-37.
42 Clewis, 139.
43 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 7.
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engaged with this ‘product.’ Indeed, for some such as Laura Hengehold,44 
Kant’s engagement with the body in the context of his Copernican revolution 
had profound effects on the role of the body as it was comprehended within 
the Western philosophy. Thus, considering Kant’s influence on the way the 
body is comprehended, it is not feasible for a paper of this caliber to go into 
the details of the role of the body in Kant’s overall philosophy. However, it 
is possible and important for this paper to show how Kant was among those 
who regarded “the body as a machine” in the sense that Michel Foucault talk-
ed about in the first volume of History of Sexuality.45 Before dwelling on this, 
let us establish what is the body for Kant:
[…] the body is the total condition of life, so that we have no 
other concept of our existence save that mediated by our body, 
and since the use of our freedom is possible only through the 
body, we see that the body constitutes a part of our self.46 
The somewhat reluctant admission of the indispensability of the body above 
comes from the mature Kant. However, his regard of the body as a so-called 
mediator was actually constant throughout his career. In one of his earliest 
writings, the thirty-one years old Kant asserted the same view with regards 
to the body:
The human being has been created to receive the impressions and 
emotions the world will arouse in him through the body that is 
the visible part of his being and the matter of which serves not 
only the invisible spirit that inhabits him to impress the first con-
cepts of external objects but also is indispensable to repeat, to 
combine, in short to think these in the internal action.47
Though she argued that Kant’s conceptualization of the body as a mediator occurred 
after 1766, Hengehold accurately noted that from that point on, Kant adopted a 
“new strategy” in which he began to regard the body as a way “to contain and 
44 Laura Hengehold, The Body Problematic Political Imagination in Kant and Foucault 
(Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 114.
45 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 139.
46 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath, and Jerome B. Schneewind (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 144; 27: 369.
47 Immanuel Kant, “Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens,” in Natural Science, 
ed. Eric Watkins, trans. Olaf Reinhardt (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 298; 1: 
335, 24-30.
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ground metaphysics.”48 And she justly cautioned against misreading Kant’s concep-
tualization of the body simply as “[…] motion detectors built into a doorway” but 
instead argued that “‘personal embodiment’ is associated in some way with all ex-
ternal experiences confirming and exhibiting the unity of transcendental perception, 
for ‘embodiment’ is precisely how forms of intuition contribute to a subject’s expe-
rience.”49 This is precisely why, in the same line, Jane Kneller, stressed an important 
dimension of personhood for Kant as he saw persons as “self-consciously physical 
substances” in that “[t]hey identify themselves (but not exclusively) with their bod-
ies. At the same time, they feel responsible for their actions, which of course include 
the way they behave toward their own and other’s bodies.”50 However, regardless 
of his consistent acknowledgment of “the unity of the soul and the body,”51 Kant 
also had a consistent “disdain” – not hostility, warned us Barbara Herman –52 to-
wards the body. I argue that his consistent disdain for the body stemmed from the 
fact that the body represents our ‘animality’53 in the sense that it has a proclivity to 
be aroused by “the impulses of nature” and hence, the need to discipline it and most 
of all through “the human mind.”54 Simply because for Kant, it is only through “[t]he 
perfection of bodily discipline” that man would be “able to live in accordance with 
his vocation.”55 But, why would that be the case for Kant? According to Crowther, 
since we are composed of ‘phenomenal’ and ‘rational’ parts which are “conjoined 
with” each other “the principles which inform our moral decisions are influenced by 
potentially distracting feelings and desires, and we can, in consequence, only act in 
an imperfectly rational way.” 56
V. Duties to oneself
Since our bodies are potential crime scenes for Kant,57 in front of his pupils, he ada-
mantly drew the limits of freedom when it comes to our bodies:
48 Hengehold, 92.
49 Ibid., 90.
50 Jane Kneller, “Kant on Sex and Marriage Right,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant and 
Modern Philosophy, ed. Paul Guyer, 447-476 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 464. 
51 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 149; 27: 376; Helge Svare, Body and Practice in Kant (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2006), 60.
52 Barbara Herman, “Could It Be Worth Thinking About Kant on Sex and Marriage?” in A Mind 
of One’s Own Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, eds. Louise M. Antony, and Charlotte 
E. Witt, 53-73 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 55.
53 Sensen, 299.
54 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 151; 27: 378.
55 Ibid., 152; 27: 379.
56 Crowther, 19.
57 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 124; 27: 342.
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We have obligationes internae erga nosmet ipsos, in regard 
to which we are outwardly quite free; anyone can do what he 
chooses with his body, and that is no concern of anyone else; 
but inwardly he is not free, for he is bound by the necessary and 
essential ends of mankind.58
The duties to oneself are what bind men inwardly with regards to their body. 
It is through these duties which Kant sought to establish “the autocracy” 59 
of the mind over the body. It would not be an exaggeration if I argue that 
these duties are of great importance for Kant’s overall system of morality. 
Kant himself accused all those before him and declared “all philosophical 
systems of morality are false” in this regard because they all regarded these 
duties “as a supplement to morality.”60 According to Kant, duties to oneself 
are so important that in their absence “there would be no duties whatsoever 
and so no external duties either.”61 Accordingly, in his lectures, Kant went 
as far as to declare that “[t]he self-regarding duties are the supreme condi-
tion and principium of all morality, for the worth of the person constitutes 
moral worth.”62 It is precisely at this point Allen Wood stressed that these 
duties “are not duties to benefit yourself, but duties to be worthy of your 
own humanity as an end in itself, which is the basic value and motive of all 
ethics”63and these duties eventually boil down to virtues and vices. According 
to some scholars,64 Kant based these duties on the aptly called ‘formula of 
humanity,’65 which famously instructs: “So act that you use humanity, wheth-
er in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time 
as an end, never merely as a means.”66 
Similar to the duties “to other human beings,” Kant divided “duties to 
ourselves” into two: “perfect and imperfect duties.”67 In order to avoid go-
58 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 61; 27: 269.
59 Ibid., 151; 27: 378-379.
60 Ibid., 122; 27: 340.
61 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 214; 6: 417, 24-25.
62 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 125; 27: 344.
63 Allen W. Wood, “How a Kantian Decides What to Do,” in The Palgrave Kant Handbook, ed. 
Matthew C. Altman, 263-284 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 270. 
64 Ibid., 275; Sensen, 300. 
65 Christine M. Korsgaard, “Introduction,” in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. 
Mary Gregor, ix-xxxvi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xxi. 
66 Kant, Groundwork, 38; 4: 429, 9-13.
67 Ibid., 31; 4: 421, 21-23.
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ing into too much detail, I would like to note that it is the perfect duties 
to oneself that concern this essay. More specifically, it is those which Kant 
considered under “subjective division” which corresponds to the “[…] one in 
terms of whether the subject of duty (views) himself both as an animal (nat-
ural) and moral being or only as a moral being.”68 The one of the vices which 
are considered under this division is related to sex – “the unnatural use of his 
sexual inclination”69 – and I would like to expand upon this subject since it is 
the plane in which we face “the constant threat of moral devolution.”70 
VI. Sexuality and masturbation
According to Kant, pleasure has a threefold structure: ‘animal pleasure,’ ‘human 
pleasure,’ and ‘spiritual pleasure.’71 What concerns this paper is the animal plea-
sure, which for Kant, “[…] consists in the feeling of the private senses.”72 This con-
cern is justified given that ‘gratification’ – and also pain, as Hengehold73 rightly 
pointed out – is a bodily phenomenon for Kant. The concept of gratification is 
the focus because all the system of discipline discussed above that is needed is 
perhaps the most evident when it comes to sex, according to Kant. Sex, for Kant, 
is where the line between our animality and humanity74 is most blurred and we are 
under the threat of degrading our humanity75 since our bodies are the epicenter.76 
This is precisely so not only because Kant believed that “[…] what happens in hu-
man sexual relations that leads to a condition compromising the moral standing 
of the partners,”77 but also, these relations are susceptible to “unnatural vices” 
such as “homosexual sex, bestiality and masturbation.”78 
The first condition is the defining feature of sexual relations which is “both 
natural and inevitable:”
68 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 216; 6: 420, 7-11.
69 Ibid.
70 Kneller, 465.
71 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, trans. Karl Ameriks, and Steve Naragon (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 64; 28: 248.
72 Ibid.
73 Hengehold, 90.
74 Helga Varden, “Kant and Sexuality,” in The Palgrave Kant Handbook, ed. Matthew C. Altman, 
331-351 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 348. 
75 Denis, 231.
76 Is it perhaps because of this dangerous condition with sex that Kant has a consistently angry 
tone while writing/talking about the issue? See Varden, 332; Alan Soble, “Kant and Sexual 
Perversion,” The Monist 86, no. 1 (2003): 64. 
77 Herman, 59.
78 Denis, 232.
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[…] that sexual interest in another is not interest in the other as 
a person. Insofar as one is moved by sexual appetite, it is the sex 
(the eroticized body, the genitalia) of the other that is the object 
of interest.79
That is, as Herman continued explaining, “the objectification of the other.”80 
The inevitability of such a threat to morality and the accompanying ‘unnat-
ural vices’ led Kant to argue that “sexual appetite must be regulated by the 
principles of practical rationality.”81 In this light, the institution of marriage 
represented the optimal solution for Kant in which partners would be the 
least morally compromised. Thus, Kant is among one of those who contrib-
uted to the confinement of sexuality into the home and more specifically, 
into “the parent’s bedroom.”82 As Kneller noted that – after having provided 
Bertolt Brecht’s remarkable take on Kant:
Kant’s most important single statement on marriage, sex and 
family is located squarely within his discussion of property rights 
in the ‘Doctrine of Right’ in the Metaphysics of Morals in which 
he described marriage as “[s]exual union in accordance with prin-
ciple” which at the same time had to be “[…] of different sexes 
for lifelong possession.83 
What made sex agreeable for Kant under “the sole condition” of marriage 
was precisely the contractarian nature of the institution: 
[…] But if I hand over my whole person to the other, and thereby 
obtain the person of the other in place of it, I get myself back 
again and have thereby regained possession of myself; for I have 
given myself to be the other’s property, but am in turn taking the 
other as my property and thereby regain myself, for I gain the 
person to whom I gave myself as property. The two persons thus 






84 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 158-159; 27: 388.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 05:38:50 |
[ 58 ]
MURAT MÜMTAZ KÖK THE MASTURBATOR AND THE BAN
As Helga Varden noted, Kant’s faith in the institution of marriage was so 
strong that he declared that “[a]ll other forms of sexuality are corruptions of 
our nature resulting from our propensity to evil.”85 In his lectures, Kant casted 
a wide net and instructed his pupils that “[a] crimen carnis is a misuse of the 
sexual impulse. Every use of it outside the state of wedlock is a misuse of it, 
or crimen carnis.”86 And, as I will argue in the following section, such “crimi-
nal acts” have dire consequences within the confines of Kantian morality. Let 
us now, for the sake of the argument of this essay (and airing the ‘evil’ of its 
author), indulge in a subject which Kant deemed to inhabit “unnatural lust,”87 
that is, of course, masturbation.
VII. Masturbation and the ban
For Kant, the feeling of the sublime does more than just “reminding and pre-
paring” us for our moral vocation. Clewis88explained that in addition to man-
ifesting the practical freedom of a person, the sublime also “reveals the sub-
ject’s membership in a moral order in which there are other free persons who 
are likewise subject to the demands of morality.”89 According to Goodreau,90 
the sublime serves as a basis for such community because of the fact that it is 
a “mental state” so “we expect that any other similarly constituted mind (any 
rational being) will experience a similar mental state when in the presence of 
the given object.” Following Kant’s line of thinking, the more one can tran-
scend “every propensity, inclination and natural tendency of ours,” the more 
esteemed one is in such moral order. Thus, Kant asserted that: “[…] so much 
so that the sublimity and inner dignity of the command in a duty is all the 
more manifest the fewer are the subjective causes in favor of it and the more 
there are against it […]”91 and concluded a few pages later that: 
[...] it is just in this independence of maxims from all such incentives that 
their sublimity consists, and the worthiness of every rational subject to 
be a law-giving member in the kingdom of ends; for otherwise he would 
have to be represented only as subject to the natural law of his needs.92 
85 Varden, 343.
86 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 161; 27: 391.




91 Kant, Groundwork, 35; 4: 425, 27-31.
92 Ibid., 46; 4: 439, 7-12.
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As I will argue, it is precisely from this community Kant excommunicates 
those who act “under the sway of animal impulse,” because in doing so, they 
put themselves in a position where they cannot “demand to have rights of 
humanity.”93
Masturbation (among several other ‘abominable’ acts in Kant’s eyes) is 
acting under such animal impulse and Kant genuinely despised it. In fact, he 
despised this criminal use of the body that arises out of a “beastly vice”94 
so much that he argued it did not even merit mentioning its name as “[…] 
such crimes are unmentionable, because the very naming of them occasions 
a disgust that does not occur with suicide.”95 Accordingly, in Metaphysics of 
Morals, Kant discussed masturbation under the “vice” of “defiling oneself by 
lust.”96 As I have pointed out above, Kant regarded this lust as “unnatural” 
simply because the person’s “[…] use of his sexual attributes” is directed to 
“mere animal pleasure, without having in view the preservation of species.”97 
Charles Kielkopf who also ‘condemned’98 masturbation explained Kant’s tele-
ological argument in a Kantian fashion and he argued that: “[…] the physical 
or animal satisfaction of masturbation is innocent while revealing that the 
masturbator’s maxim or policy expresses rebellion against human sexuali-
ty.”99 Even though, Kielkopf’s arguments sound like the reminiscent of one of 
the “four great strategic unities”100 in Foucault’s analysis, Kant’s teleological 
argument is not that important with regards to the issue of masturbation. 
As Alan Soble pointed out,101 even though Kant opens the section with this 
teleological argument, he based most of his “blanket condemnation” on the 
“formula of humanity.” Indeed, he often compared these “crimes” with sui-
cide and found suicide more honorable: 
[…] murdering oneself requires courage, and in this disposition, there 
is still always room for respect for the humanity in one’s own per-
son. But unnatural lust, which is complete abandonment of oneself 
to animal inclination, makes man not only an object of enjoyment 
93 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 71; 27: 1428.
94 Ibid., 153; 27: 380.
95 Ibid., 161; 27: 392.
96 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 220-221; 4: 424.
97 Ibid., 221; 4: 424, 1-5.




101 Soble, 61. 
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but, still further, a thing that is contrary to nature, that is, a loath-
some object and so deprives him of all respect for himself.102 
As the excerpt above also illuminates, the consequences that the masturbator 
has to suffer are solely regarded to the respect in his own personality and in the 
eyes of other persons. As Samuel J. Kerstein pointed out,103 according to Kant, 
“[i]n the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or dignity”104 and only 
humanity has a dignity in this kingdom. Since, Kant considered the refraining 
oneself from the act of masturbation under “perfect duties to oneself,”105 there 
is “no exception in favor of inclination”106 and the violation brings about dire 
consequences for the masturbator. This is where “the ban” emerges in Kant’s 
realm of morality “as the force of simultaneous attraction and repulsion that 
ties together the two poles of the sovereign exception: bare life and power, 
homo sacer and the sovereign.”107 According to Kant, “[…] the man who has 
violated the duties to himself has no inner worth,”108 because “[b]y his beastly 
vices, man puts himself below the beasts”109 and thus, I argue, turns himself into 
something that is similar to “the werewolf.”110 Kant asserted: 
[…] That which a man can dispose over, must be a thing. Animals 
are here regarded as things; but man is no thing; so if, neverthe-
less, he disposes over his life, he sets upon himself the value of 
a beast. But he who takes himself for such, who fails to respect 
humanity, who turns himself into a thing, becomes an object 
of free choice for everyone; anyone, thereafter, may do as he 
pleases with him; he can be treated by others as an animal or 
a thing; he can be dealt with like a horse or dog, for he is no 
longer a man; he has turned himself into a thing, and so cannot 
demand that others should respect the humanity in him, since he 
has already thrown it away himself. 111
102 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 221; 6: 425, 30-36.
103 Samuel J. Kerstein, “Treating Oneself Merely as a Means,” in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, ed. 
Monika Betzler, 201-218 (New York: de Gruyter, 2008), 207. 
104 Kant, Groundwork, 42; 4: 434, 1-3.
105 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 218; 6: 421, 5.
106 Kant, Groundwork, 31; 4: 421.
107 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 110. 
108 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 123; 27: 341.
109 Ibid., 153; 27: 380.
110 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 105.
111 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 147.
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Kant pronounced this thing as “homo sacer” as he transformed him into some-
thing which is “the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.”112 
After all, as Agamben argued, what is sovereignty but “[…] the ‘law beyond 
the law to which we are abandoned?’” 113
VIII. Conclusion
In one of his relatively recent works, Agamben, in fact, described a rather 
constant conceptualization of man in Kant’s corpus where he emphasized Al-
exandre Kojéve’s definition of man as “a field of dialectical tensions” and 
asserted that: 
Man exists historically only in this tension; he can be human only 
to the degree that he transcends and transforms the anthropo-
phorous animal which supports him, and only because, through 
the action of negation, he is capable of mastering and, eventual-
ly, destroying his own animality […]114
Indeed, Kant’s writings on the masturbator, the homosexual or “the Negro”115 
boiled down to this central concern that is, who should be considered human? 
In all these cases, Kant condemned the non-human beyond mere animality and 
in this essay I have tried to argue that it is precisely bare life where Kant con-
demned the non-human. In doing so, the West’s “thinker of human dignity” 
did indeed produce “oppressive texts.”116 In this regard, similar to Soble,117 
I cannot help but think how horrifying it must have been for the students of 
112 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 84.
113 Ibid., 59.
114 Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 12.
115 See e.g.: Robert Bernasconi, “Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism,” in Philosophers 
on Race: Critical Essays, eds. Julie K. Ward, and Tommy L. Lott, 145-166 (Malden, and Ox-
ford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002); Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, “The Color of Reason: The Idea 
of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology,” in Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, ed. 
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, 103-140 (Cambridge, and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997); Em-
manuel Chukwudi Eze, “Philosophy and the ‘Man’ in the Humanities,” Topoi 18, no. 1 (1999): 
49-58; Ronald Judy, “Kant and the Negro,” Surfaces 1 (1991): 1-64; Charles Mills, “Kant’s 
Untermenschen,” in Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, ed. Andrew Valls, 169-193 (Ithaca, 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2005).
116 Alain David, “Negroes,” in Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy, eds. Robert 
Bernasconi, and Sybol Cook, 8-18 (Bloomington, and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2003), 11.
117 Soble, 81.
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Kant while the philosopher of morality condemned you and pronounced you 
a lowly thing just because of who you are or what you do.
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